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This paper examines the reform of water and irrigation management in 
Africa and compares it with similar reforms in Asia.  Several things are evident 
from the review.  First, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is at an earlier stage of irrigation 
development and reform than Asia.  Second, the articulated need for reform is 
much stronger in Asia than it is in SSA.  Third, the productivity of small-scale 
irrigated farms is significantly lower in SSA compared to Asia.  Thus any 
irrigation investment strategy in SSA should be different from Asia and focus on 
increasing small-farm productivity as well as small-scale irrigation projects.  
Finally, all direct government irrigation investments should be done jointly with 
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REFORM OF IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT AND INVESTMENT POLICY 
IN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
   This paper reviews the water and irrigation management experienced in 
Africa to see if these same key factors that are limiting irrigation productivity in 
Asia are also limiting in Africa.  Irrigation has not been as important a part of 
Africa’s past development strategies as it has been in Asia but water scarcity is 
growing in Africa.  Still Africa has not been plagued as much by large, top-down 
managed irrigation systems as has Asia.  The review considers five key water 
management reforms and asks whether any of these reforms are needed in Africa.  
Reforms in a number of countries are used to illustrate different approaches and 
constraints that have raised the transaction cost of reform.  
 
2.  REFORM STRATEGY AND TRANSACTION COSTS 
 
  There is now a general consensus concerning the strategy to reform water 
and irrigation management in Asia as reflected in the World Bank’s water policy 
paper (World Bank, 1993).  However, it is not clear that this same strategy will 
work as well in Africa.  For example, irrigation development is at an earlier stage 
in Africa and modernization of existing systems may be less important.  Still in 
countries like South Africa, Morocco and Tunisia, irrigation modernization is 
needed.  Furthermore, Burt and Styles (1998) found, in their review of irrigation 
projects for the World Bank, most of the systems that are not correctly designed 
are difficult to operate.   
 
2.1  Irrigation Reform 
 
  The reform strategy delineated by Easter (2000:372) and the World Bank’s 
water policy paper (World Bank, 1993:65-79) as a means for modernizing water 
and irrigation management includes five basic actions: 
 
1.  Reform the legal, institutional and organizational framework for managing 
water resources so that the management units internalize the costs of water 
provision and are accountable for providing quality service.  
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2.  Develop better economic incentive systems including improved water pricing 
and water markets.  
3.  Fully account for the environmental impacts of water use when designing, 
constructing, and managing irrigation systems, including the external 
impacts that are created within an irrigation system by return flows and 
fluctuations in water releases from reservoirs.  This involves taking a basin-
wide approach to water management, including both surface water and 
groundwater basins, and improving watershed management capabilities.  
4.  Reform delivery of agricultural technical assistance in irrigation areas so 
that it complements irrigation improvements.  This will require mutual 
respect and close cooperation between the irrigation and agriculture 
ministries. 
5.  Improve water investment decisions by considering the full range of benefits 
and costs that are created by water development.  New project investments 
and investments to improve exiting irrigation systems must have significant 
user input and use appropriate infrastructure and technology (Easter, 
2000:372). 
 
  What we are concerned about in this paper is whether or not this strategy is 
appropriate for Africa and if it is can it be implemented given that some of the 
stakeholders will not gain and may even be worse-off. The losers are likely to be 
overstaffed irrigation and water supply agencies, farmers at the head of irrigation 
canals, and higher income, urban homeowners and business owners.  The latter two 
may have to pay higher water fees for water purchased from farmers. 
 
2.2  Lowering Reform Costs 
 
  In general it has been difficult to initiate effective water reforms.  This has 
been the case even when public entities have followed Briscoe’s (1997:153) 
suggestions and reforms were started only after there was “a powerful articulated 
need for reform.”  The articulated need might be part of a country’s effort to 
privatize public sector activities as happened in Chile, or as a response to severe 
water management problems as occurred in Andhra Pradesh, India.  Andhra 
Pradesh and Chile also followed Briscoe’s charge to involve stakeholders in reform 
discussions and to address their fears, concerning possible changes, in an effective 
and understandable manner.  His third recommendation, that one should start with 
the relatively easy problems first and be sensitive and innovative in adapting 
general principles to different institutional and environmental situations, was  
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followed in Chile but not in Andhra Pradesh.  Finally, as Briscoe says, there is no 
silver bullet or panacea; the reform must fit a county’s institutions and resources.  
  The process of reform is likely to be slow.  Water agencies have a difficult 
time changing their supply-based approach to solving water problems.  This is 
understandable given the large investments in supply development that have been 
made in the past by international agencies and developing countries.  In contrast, 
policies involving demand-side solutions have been difficult to enforce and are 
unpopular with stakeholders in most developing countries. 
 
2.3  Transaction Costs  
 
  To effectively introduce water reform the transaction costs of reform have to 
be reduced.  To reduce the transaction costs of changing government policy, one of 
the key steps is to reduce the expenses of organizing and involve the stakeholders 
in specific water management reforms.  Transaction costs include search and 
information costs, bargaining and decision costs, and monitoring and enforcement 
costs (Dahlman, 1979:141-162).  Some specific tasks that will be added to the 
transition costs of water reform include designing regulations for allocating water 
in an open and transparent manner, developing water delivery schedules in 
conjunction with stakeholders, enacting water-use rights and procedures to register 
them, designing transparent review procedures for water-use rights applications, 
and conducting open hearings concerning disputes over water allocation and water-
use rights.   
 
  Transaction costs are likely to increase as the diversity and number of parties 
involved increase.  Consequently, reforming large irrigation systems with a large 
number of small-scale farms is likely to be difficult and involve high transaction 
costs. Williamson (1985:17-18) argues that a key reason for changes in economic 
organization is to reduce transaction costs.  The same argument can be made for 
reforming the institutional and organizational arrangements for irrigation systems 
and water agencies.  Thus, a key question is what institutional or organizational 
reforms will reduce transaction costs of  improving water management.  To help 
answer this and other questions, one can evaluate the experience of countries that 
have reformed their water sector.  For example, several countries that reformed 
their economies found that they could make dramatic changes in their water 
institutions (Chile, Australia, Mexico, and South Africa, for example).  Combining 
economic reforms with reforms in water management reduced the transaction costs 
of changing institutional arrangements for water management.    
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3.0  REFORM OF IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT 
 
  In contrast to Asia, the need for reform in the water sector does not appear to 
have been given sufficiently high priority in most of Africa.  Thus, it appears that 
Africa does not meet Briscoe’s first requirement.  Several exceptions to this may 
be South Africa and several North African countries.  Consequently, we will focus 
the analysis more on these countries to see what progress they have made in 
reform.  In those African countries that have tried to reform water management, 
have they introduced any of the five reforms listed above? 
 
3.1  Legal, Institutional and Organizational Reform 
 
A number of the leading irrigating countries have turned over some parts of 
irrigation management to Water User Associations (WUAs) and have done so with 
varying degrees of success. A key institutional reform was to give WUAs authority 
over water management and cost recovery.  To illustrate the range of success, four, 
middle-income, developing countries - Mexico, Tunisia, Morocco and South 
Africa - will be reviewed in this section which draws on the paper by Zekri and 
Easter (2003). 
 
Mexico began establishing WUAs in 1990 and is considered a fairly 
successful reform experience with 400 WUAs (average size 7,600 ha.) operational 
by 1997.  A survey of 6% of the districts showed that water use efficiency and 
maintenance had improved with water charges going up in a majority of districts, 
and increasing by over 500% in some cases. Government subsidy dropped to only 
15% of the operation and maintenance (O&M) costs in the transferred districts. 
Many WUA used bank loans to make significant investments in repair or 
modernization of their infrastructure.  Since more than 90% of farmers paid their 
irrigation assessment charges, partly because farmers have to pay the irrigation 
charges in advance of receiving WUA service, the irrigation assessments acted as 
loan guarantees. 
 
The skills of hired technical staff have increased the effectiveness of 
Mexico’s WUAs. In many districts, WUAs have assisted their members in 
obtaining inputs and renting machinery.  By the end of 1996, Eight Limited-
Responsibility Companies, which are federations of WUAs, were providing 
services to the WUAs. These eight companies are interested in expanding their 
services beyond just operations, maintenance and management of the major  
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infrastructure (Palacios, 1999:20). The current reforms have focused on the larger 
schemes and farms, while the more difficult task, which has just started, is the 
transfer of water management on smaller schemes and farms (Simas, 2002:152). 
One of the major reasons for the positive Mexican experience, was the 
commitment to reform by the President.  
 
Management in Morocco turnover did not begin until 1994.  In their review 
of the large irrigation of Gharb, which covers 250,000 ha., El Hasnaoui, Boulassel 
and Raki (2002) report that WUAs were ineffective because of administrative and 
institutional failures. First, the clearly stipulated responsibilities of the public 
agencies and WUA were not followed. For example, the water agency did not 
return 20% of the water charges to the WUA (as promised) due to restrictions 
imposed by the Finance Ministry. Second, the conveyance system was in poor 
condition and unreliable.  Third, farmers lacked access to markets and credit.  In 
contrast the traditional irrigation systems in the south have had a more positive 
experience with WUAs since the farmers have traditionally had greater water 
management responsibilities. 
 
South Africa has experienced both success and failure its establishment of 
WUAs because of the differences in institutional arrangement. The Irrigation 
Boards (IB), the White Settlement Schemes (WSS) and the Small Irrigation 
Schemes (SIS) each have a different institutional arrangement. Perret (2002:295) 
found that most of IBs change quickly into WUAs soon after enactment of the 
New Water Act.  The 300 IBs were already primarily private, farmer-managed, 
water systems with a management board or committee.  Since the government 
developed WSS schemes involved farmer-owned private land, management 
turnover and formation of WUAs went fairly quickly.  In contrast, the SIS 
management turnover was done in a different institutional setting and was not 
successful.  Only ten pilot WUAs were formally established among 300 schemes 
countrywide. Part of the problem was that the SIS have an average farm size of 
less than 2 ha and farmers only have a permission certificate to occupy the land, 
which provides exclusive individual, life-time usufructuary land rights.  Shah, 
Koppen, Merry, Lange and Samad (2002:6-11) lists a number of reasons why the 
SIS failed including the small farm size, high management costs of WUAs due to 
the large number of users, poor access to markets, low productivity of farms, and a 
high level of O&M costs relative to gross margins. The success of the IBs was due 
primarily to the fact that management turnover merely formalized and legitimized 
high de facto farmer participation in already well-managed irrigation schemes.  
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Although the reform in Tunisia dates back to 1987, the WUAs law was not 
enacted until 1990 and then was liberalized in 1992.  Over 960 WUA were 
legalized by 2000 and they controlled 56% of the irrigated area under public 
schemes. The average size of a WUA is about 122 ha with 100 members. Only 
30% of WUAs were able to cover their O&M costs without any public subsidy. 
Maintenance of the system is still done by the Regional Authorities for 
Agricultural Development (CRDAs). In a review of the water sector, the Director 
General of Water Resources (1998) reports that WUAs were very dependent on the 
CRDAs and did not show any real ability to manage water, as illustrated by the 
poorly maintained delivery systems.  The constraints, to WUA effectiveness 
include: 1) the lack of coordination between the Ministries of Agriculture, Interior 
and Finance, 2) the absence of enterprises in the rural areas which specialize in 
maintenance of hydraulic systems, 3) the need for renovation of the conveyance 
systems managed by CRDAs and, 4) strong administrative control over the WUAs, 
including the nomination of members by the government which limits local 
decision-making.  In addition, the WUAs must present their budget to the 
Governor and then wait for his approval.  Finally, there is ex post financial control 
by the local Director of the Ministry of Finance. This all exhibits an exaggerated 
fear of the misuse of public funds and has caused unnecessary financial rigidity, 
which has increased management costs and reduced flexibility.  
 
  These four cases illustrate that, under certain institutional settings, WUAs 
appear to be difficult to establish or maintain and in such cases they are not likely 
to constitute a sustainable solution to water management problems.  For such 
management and institutional reforms to work, the following conditions need to be 
in place. 
 
1.  The country needs a functioning legal system or some other effective 
alternative means for resolving water conflicts. 
2.  Decisions concerning reform and future water management, particularly 
financial decisions, need to be made in an effective and transparent manner. 
3.  Users need to have assurances that the government will do what they say 
they will do, particularly regarding the reforms and transfers of funds. 
 
  In meeting these conditions, countries with private sector participation in the 
provisions of urban water and wastewater management services may be able to 
transfer this experience to the irrigation sector.  Even private management 
experience from other sectors, such as electricity, gas, and telecommunications,  
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can be helpful in making changes in the irrigation sector since many of the 
institutional requirements are the same.   
 
In some cases alternative models need to be tried, such as management 
contracts.  Egypt, for example, has used contracts for the operation and 
maintenance of pumping stations.  Mali has gone a step further and established the 
Office du Niger as a private enterprise with shares held by the Government, which 
is in charge of managing the irrigation network under a three-year performance 
contract. Elected farmers participate on governance committees with Office du 
Niger’s staff (Deimer, 2002:21-22). Mexico considered private management of 
their main irrigation canals, but instead gave the responsibility to Limited-
Responsibility Companies (Palacios, 1999:10-14). The Mexico case has the 
advantage that farmers are participating in the capital and management decisions.  
 
  Whatever model is used, more attention is needed to develop improved ways 
to define water rights or water-use rights particularly for small farms and to 
establish clear agency and user responsibilities.  This will be important in 
clarifying for farmers what they will receive in terms of water deliveries.  Once 
farmers have well-established water rights, the dynamics of water management 
changes.  It now becomes the responsibility of the water management unit to 
effectively deliver water to farmers or WUAs. 
 
3.2  Incentives and Cost Recovery 
 
  Low water prices and the lack of economic incentives for efficient water use 
have been a concern for many years.  Yet there are a large number of stakeholders 
who do not think higher water prices are appropriate.  One view is that on-farm 
and household efficiency in water use is not important and that basin efficiency is 
the key since water lost by run-off or percolation will be used downstream.  
Another argument is that small-scale farmers and low income households do not 
have enough income to pay the full costs of water, or that for farmers the value of 
water has been capitalized into land values.  Another concern is that farmers may 
have to pay for the government’s mistakes in building unprofitable, badly 
designed, poorly managed and overstaffed projects to increase food production and 
lower food prices.  In addition, it is difficult to measure the volume of water each 
farm receives in big irrigation systems that serve large numbers of small-scale 
farms.  Consequently, water prices and cost recovery (30-50% of O&M costs) have  
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been relatively low in many developing countries (Dinar and Subramanian, 
1997:155-156). 
 
  Thus ministries of finance and international organizations, such as the World 
Bank, have found it difficult to get countries to raise their price of water and 
increase the incentives for improved water use.  Still there is growing support for 
the proposition that farmers served by projects designed to increase irrigated 
agricultural production and farm income should pay the O&M cost of irrigation 
and at least contribute something toward capital cost.  To reach this goal, several 
new and innovative approaches have been tried, including water markets, capacity 
sharing and private financing of water infrastructure. 
 
  Water markets with their incentives for efficient water use is not a new idea, 
but it has gained support in recent years. One example of successful water markets 
comes from Chile where they were built on effective WUAs, well-managed 
infrastructure, and registration private water rights based on past use. These private 
rights are separated from land and have the same legal standing as other property 
rights.  There are few conditions set on prices or water use by buyers (Thobani, 
1998:38).  Chile’s history of direct involvement of the private sector in irrigation 
development provided a good basis for introducing water rights and water markets 
in 1981 (Hearne, 1998:142-144).  
 
  In the developed countries, such as the United States, water markets have 
emerged as a response to environmental concerns regarding new projects, 
escalating costs of new supplies, and the growing demands for additional water. 
Markets are an economic mechanism for increasing efficiency and adding 
flexibility through allowing voluntary transfers of water.  In South Africa the 
trading of water rights has occurred in certain schemes, such as the Hereford 
irrigation scheme.   Another option being considered in South Africa is reservoir 
capacity sharing (Gakpo, Du Plessis and Viljoen, 2001:90-91).  In capacity sharing 
water users buy long term or perpetual rights to storage capacity in a reservoir.  
Those rights can be bought and sold on a permanent to temporary basis.  Gakpo et 
al., (2001:91) point out that “the concept of capacity sharing is known to be 
operational only in two countries, namely Zimbabwe and Australia.  The first 
capacity sharing scheme in the Mazowe Catchment in Zimbabwe dates back to 
1984, when eleven commercial farmers formed the first ‘Combined Irrigation 
Scheme’ (CIS) as described in the Zimbabwe Water Act of 1976.  The entire CIS 
was legally considered as having a single water right.  Therefore there was no  
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reason in law why members of the CIS should not manage their individual sub-
rights as described as long as there was no prejudice to other right holders.”   
 
  In contrast to South Africa, water trading in Morocco and Tunisia has been 
limited to a few informal trades.  One reason water markets have not been 
implemented in Tunisia is the limited pipe capacity in some systems during periods 
of high irrigation water demands and the high transaction costs of transferring 
water to urban users.  The opportunity cost of water in farming is high during 
periods of peak water demand, particularly in areas producing high valued crops, 
again reducing net returns from trading water to other areas or sectors.  In contrast, 
Diao and Roe (2003:708) found that water trading in Morocco, combined with 
market liberalization in agriculture, would raise water allocation efficiency and 
benefit the whole economy.  
 
  Water trading is not just between actual users.  For example, WUAs in 
Mexico negotiate contracts for water at the end of winter season with prices either 
freely agreed upon between traders and/or fixed by the CNA (Comisión Nacional 
del Agua). The prices are not likely to reflect the scarcity value of water since 
cooperation between the WUAs, who are members of a Limited Responsibility 
Company, plays a major role in the water exchanges (Kloezen, 1998:452). 
However, since water rights are held by WUAs and not by the farmers, trading 
may be limited by the lack of incentives for farmers to sell water and use it 
efficiently.   
 
In cases where variability in supply or demand is a key concern, then the 
option or contingent transfer contract is a good market approach to consider.  
With a contingent market the seller agrees to deliver water to the buyer, for a price, 
whenever predefined conditions are met. A buyer purchases a call option paying a 
value C for the call option. At the end of the expiration date the holder of the call 
option must decide whether to purchase the water or not, while the seller is 
required to provide the water if the call is exercised. When the owner of the call 
option decides to buy the water, he or she has to pay the strike price K for the water 
as specified in the call option. If the option is not used, the seller of the call option 
keeps the value of the option and remains the owner of the water. Option contracts 
for water are likely to be more complicated than the above example options in the 
sense that the period of time, or expiration date, could be longer than one year and 
the possibilities to call can be multiple times during the period (Villinski, 2002:12-
13).  One example of such an option was the option bank that the California  
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Department of Water Resources (CDWR) initiated at the end of 1994.  However, 
no calls were made due to improved rainfall, consequently sellers kept their option 
payment and were free to use or resell the water. This was a publicly managed 
market, and the prices were fixed by the CDWR (Howitt, 1998:131). 
 
3.3  Environmental Improvements and Externalities (A Basin Approach) 
 
  Sub-Saharan Africa needs to follow an integrated water management 
strategy, but may find it difficult to do so.  “Every Sub-Saharan African country 
shares one or more rivers with its neighbors and many countries see most of their 
waters flowing from or to other countries” (Grey, Gilgan-Hunt, Sharma, Roth, 
Damhaug, and Okau, 1996:34).  “There are at least fifty-four rivers or water bodies 
that cross or form international boundaries in the region.  Few of the transboundary 
river basins in the region are effectively jointly managed, and there are many 
downstream countries that depend on water flow via upstream rivers” (Grey et al., 
1996:35-36).  In this context, the Lesotho Highlands integrated water management 
scheme seems to be an exception.  It involves a large, regional, binational, water 
rights trade between Lesotho, and South Africa.  If completed, the Scheme “will 
double the water resource available to the Gauteng region, which is the economic 
and industrial heartland of southern Africa, sustaining its continued development, 
while at the same time greatly benefiting Lesotho” (deVilliers, Schmitz and 
Booysen, 1996:73).  Still some environmental concerns have been raised involving 
possible ecological impacts of such a large transfer of water. 
 
  Another positive development in river basin coordination in Africa is the 
Nile Basin Initiative.  It is led by the Council of Ministers of Water Affairs of the 
Nile Basin States and supported by a small secretariat based in Entebbe, Uganda.  
The action program includes basin-wide technical assistance projects designed to 
lay the foundation for cooperative action and two sub-basin investment programs 
(World Bank, 2003:80-81). 
 
  Given the environmental concerns that are raised about large water projects 
such as the Lesotho scheme and the level of African development, future water 
development will likely be focused on smaller scale project.  This is the best 
approach for much of SSA given its experience with large-scale irrigation.  Large 
irrigation projects are complex and are difficult to organize effectively for large 
numbers of small farms of less than a hectare.  In addition, new irrigation should  
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proceed slowly since in many countries there is a general lack of information about 
water resources and especially about groundwater resources (Lazarus, 1997:48). 
 
3.4  Coordination between Agriculture and Irrigation? 
 
  In many countries there has been a continued failure of irrigation and 
agricultural agencies to coordinate their activities to help increase agricultural 
production in irrigated areas.  In fact, as noted above, lack of coordination among 
ministries in Tunisia is one of the three reasons given for the failure of WUA.   
Most new or expanded irrigation projects need technical irrigation and agricultural 
production assistance, as well as, marketing services provided by extension agents 
and by an expanded private sector.  Without adequate supplies of inputs and 
reasonable market outlets for the agricultural products, irrigated output will be 
limited by downward pressure on product prices and limited input supplies 
especially in SSA were agricultural productivity is already low. 
 
  An example of the adverse consequences of inadequate input and product 
markets is the failure of smallholder schemes in South Africa where parastatals 
have withdrawn.  “Most smallholder schemes in South Africa are located in former 
homelands in remote areas away from towns and cities with which they often have 
poor market linkages” (Shah et al., 2002:7).  With the withdrawal of parastatals, 
there is now a huge institutional vacuum.  Both input and output markets that were 
available under parastatal schemes have disappeared, on these smallholder 
schemes in the Northern Province of South Africa (Shah et al., 2002:7). 
 
  What is needed is a well-coordinated package of irrigation and agricultural 
extension assistance delivered jointly.  The agricultural extension would be 
focused on crop production practices.  Irrigation extension, which is almost 
nonexistent in SSA, would provide information concerning how to determine 
moisture stress and how much water to apply, methods for controlling salinization, 
how to avoid water logging and soil erosion, and how and when to do 
maintenance.  Where irrigation extension exists, it is a top down approach.  
Irrigation extension views farmers as labor and their role is to implement 
operations according to specific instructions.  This is in contrast to considering 
extension as two-way communication between technicians and farmers where both 




  The failure of extension efforts is closely related to the lack of an active 
private sector which has been seriously retarded by government policies in many 
developing countries (Easter, 2000:382-383).  Clearly African countries must 
promote private and cooperative enterprises in areas where parastatals have 
abandoned smallholder irrigation projects.  Hopefully these enterprises can help fill 
some of the gaps left by parastatals.  Part of the problem is that the presence of the 
parastatals has depressed private sector development and they cannot be expected 
to appear without official encouragement. 
 
3.5  Investment Decisions (Infrastructure) 
 
  Investment in irrigation poses a real dilemma for SSA countries.  The 
number of farms under one hectare in size is large and growing.  This growth is 
projected to continue, as Africa is the only region of the world forecasted to have a 
growth in rural population through 2030.  In addition, these small farms have low 
productivity and many of those with irrigation have had high O&M costs relative 
to farm income and to costs in other countries (Table 1).  In fact, many small-scale 
farmers that are served by pumped irrigation systems cannot take advantage of the 
management control offered by such systems because of the high O&M costs.  
Finally, poverty in Africa is very high among this growing population of small-
scale farmers. 
   
  Developing an irrigation investment strategy that can be effective for small-
scale farmers is a real challenge.  Yet it can help many Africa countries move 
closer to meeting their goals of an equitable distribution of water resources and 
increased economic development.  What the investment strategy would look like is 
not clear. But it is clear that decisions concerning design and management need to  
explicitly take into account the small-holder clientele and help them increase their 
productivity since yields in SSA are low compared to other areas.  
 
  One part of this strategy will be increased infrastructure investment.  With 
its high rainfall variability and low storage capacity in reservoirs, new investments 
in water resource infrastructure will be important. However, Africa faces high 
costs in infrastructure development relative to other regions (SSA $8,300, North 
Africa $6,800, and South Asia $2,500) (Rosegrant and Perez, 1997:29).  This is 
also true for rehabilitation costs, which are at least four times the costs in India and 
China (SSA $2,100, India $260-$550, China $140-$440) (Rosegrant and Perez, 
1997:40; Easter, 2000:383).  Yet “at their present stages of economic and water  
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resources development,” Rosegrant and Perez (1997:13) argue that “most of Sub-
Saharan Africa will likely be primarily concerned with supply augmentation” as 
opposed to demand management 
 
  One effective approach is to have the government play a more limited role 
and only provide indirect investment that leaves ownership and management of the 
system with the users (Coward, 1986:239-241).  The indirect investment involves 
grants, loans, technical expertise and legal assistance to implement privately 
owned and managed irrigation development.  Brown and Nooter (1992:x-xi) argue 
this will work best when “(a) technology is simple and low cost, … (b) the 
institutional arrangements for operating the system are private …, (c) the 
supporting infrastructure is adequate to permit access to inputs and to markets for 
the sale of surplus production, (d) the systems generate high and timely cash 
returns to farmers, and (e) the farmer is an active and committed participant in 
project design and implementation.” 
 
  Rosegrant and Perez (1997:34)find “that areas under farmer controlled 
small-scale systems have grown rapidly over the past decades and account for a 
large and growing share of irrigated area in Sub-Saharan Africa.”  Both Niger and 
Nigeria have had significant private irrigation development.  In Niger private 
development of shallow groundwater has irrigated 60,000 ha while in Nigeria 
about 800,000 ha have been irrigated by farmer initiated and controlled small-scale 
irrigation. 
 
  Burt and Styles (1998) in their review of projects designed to improve 
government irrigation in 16, primarily large, developing country schemes found 
that hardware improvements were almost always needed.  Without key design and 
hardware changes, the promotion of WUAs would likely fail.  Although most 
design changes were relatively simple, they needed to be integrated with 
operational and management changes.  One of the keys they argue is how water 
moves and is controlled throughout an irrigation project in terms of both hardware 
and operations.  Design changes can significantly reduce the transaction costs of 
managing and delivering water, but these changes will require increased 
expenditures on infrastructure.  Finally, for systems serving large numbers of small 
farms to be effective, additional design changes and costs are likely to be required. 
 




An important question involves the sequence of government investments and  
institutional development in water projects.  If rehabilitation occurs before the 
system is turned over to users, then users must be involved in planning the 
rehabilitation, especially if they are expected to repay costs and provide O&M.  In 
small-holder systems in Africa, the first step may need to be to help farmers 
increase productivity and incomes before major rehabilitation can be considered. 
User involvement will be critical in designing effective irrigation investments that 
reduce the costs of water management and increase agricultural productivity. 
 
A particular concern for government is whether or not to rehabilitate projects 
where the estimated benefits are less than rehabilitation costs.  Based on strictly 
economic analysis, the projects would be rejected.  This poses a real dilemma for 
many African countries that do not need more migrants moving to their already 
overcrowded cities.  Irrigated agriculture can provide employment for many 
families and keep them from moving to urban areas.  Such projects may also create 
employment and other benefits, such as village water supply and fishing that are 
many times not counted as benefits in irrigation projects. 
 
A third issue involves a country’s interest and abilities to value 
environmental impacts of water projects.  A complete economic analysis is 
required for most large-scale irrigation, but good examples of such analysis in 
developing countries are still limited (Tubpen, 1986:135-145, and Easter, Dixon 
and Hufschmidt, 1991:53-69).  International funding of the environmental 
component of such studies would help improve the studies.  For projects funded 
with internal funds, there are few incentives for a country to include information 
on negative environmental impacts in their project evaluations.  China’s Three 
Gorges dam is a prime example of environmental concerns being discounted.  The 
same problem has occurred in large water projects in Africa and South Asia.  Yet 
pressure from environmental groups is now limiting funding of large water projects 
by international agencies and will be a major consideration in future development 
of water in Africa. 
 
A fourth issue involves measuring not only the full cost but the full benefits 
of irrigation projects.  In a number of cases benefits for other water uses in 
irrigation projects are important but not counted.  For example, domestic water 
supply, fish production, livestock water, industrial water use, and small-scale 
hydropower can be important benefits that are not included.  In three large projects 
in India these uncounted benefits ranged from 6 to 12% of total ex-post benefits.   
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In addition, there may be secondary benefits because of expanding input demands 
and the need to market the increased output.  In project evaluation we will need to 
do a better job of counting the full cost and benefits of irrigation projects. 
 
Even with the measurement of all benefits and an expanded investment in 
irrigation infrastructure in SSA, the added irrigation is not likely to solve the 
projected shortfall in food production.  Sub-Saharan Africa just does not have the 
large areas suitable for irrigation that Asia had in the last half century.  Rosegrant 
and Perez (1997:24) found that “The amount of land under irrigation and the 
potential exploitable relative to total crop area is simple not large enough to 
generate revolutionary changes in crop production.  However, the impacts that are 
generated from investment in irrigation are important.  Probably the most 
significant impact is the reduction in cereal imports in Sub-Sahara from 29 million 




  Two aspects are clear about irrigation reform and investment in Africa.  
First, there are no silver bullets or simple solutions that will fit all or even most 
situations.  Second, the stage and need for reform in SSA is different from that in 
Asia.  The articulated need for reform in SSA is not as strong as it is in Asia, 
primarily because the level of irrigation development in Africa is lower. 
 
  Another key difference is the productivity of the small-scale farms, which is 
significantly lower in SSA than in Asia.   The growth in rural population in Africa 
means the number of small farms will increase in the future.  Also, many of the 
small-holder schemes in SSA are pumping systems with high O&M costs (Shah et 
al., 2002:10-11).  A further difference is that many of the small holders are women 
and their cropping income is only a small part of total income.  In addition, these 
small holders are likely to have insecure land tenure, which takes away any 
incentive to improve larger run productivity. 
 
  In a number of respects African and Asian countries have experienced 
similar water problems.  Countries in both regions have had difficulty in 
organizing effective WUAs that serve small holders.  As a result a few countries in 
both regions have started experimenting with alternative models for delivering 




  On the economic side, both regions have had difficulty collecting irrigation 
fees just to cover O&M costs.  This failure has lead some countries in the two 
regions to try water markets as an alternative means to improve water use 
efficiency and water allocation.  An important part of establishing water markets is 
assigning water rights.  If done effectively, this can create very positive incentives 
for improving water use. 
 
  Environmental concerns involving large water projects are quite similar in 
the two regions.  Where Africa is different is in the large number of international 
rivers that need to be managed effectively.  Thus, although countries in both 
regions see the need for integrated water management, to implement a successful 
integrated strategy in Africa is going to be a more difficult task. 
 
  Not surprisingly both regions have a problem with conflicting ministries 
serving irrigation and agriculture.  The long-run solution to this problem is to 
encourage the private sector to supply agricultural inputs and provide markets and 
transportation for the production from the irrigated farms.  It also may mean 
expanded private sector management of failed public water systems. 
 
  Finally, the investment strategy may need to be different for the two regions.  
Small-scale farms are the norm for much of SSA and Asia.  But the productivity of 
small holders in Africa has lagged behind their Asian counterparts.  Thus the 
investment strategy for SSA irrigation has to give increasing productivity a high 
priority.  For both regions future investments in irrigation need to focus on the 
needs of small-scale farms.  In many cases, this will change the investment 
emphasis to small-scaled projects with active user participation and to indirect 
investment supporting private small-scale irrigation development.  For direct 
government investment in projects, infrastructure investments must be made 
jointly with decisions about the project’s management structure.  The old approach, 





Briscoe, J.  (1997), “Managing Water as an Economic Good:  Rules for 
Reformers,” Water Supply, vol 15, no 4, pp153-72, Harrogate, Yorkshire. 
 
Brown, E. P. and Nooter, R. (1992),  “Successful Small-Scale Irrigation in the  
 
18 
Sahel,” World Bank Technical Paper No. 171, World Bank, Washington, 
D.C. 
 
Burt, C. M. and Styles, S.W. (1998),  Modern Water Control and Management 
Practices in Irrigation:  Impact and Performance, Report to the World Bank 
Research Committee, Washington, D.C. 
 
Coward, E.W.  (1986), “Direct or Indirect Alternatives for Irrigation Investment 
and the Creation of Property,” in Easter, K. William (ed), Irrigation 
Investment, Technology and Management Strategies for Development, 
Westview Press, Boulder, CO. 
 
Dahlman, Carl J.  (1979), “The Problem of Externality,”  Journal of Law and 
Economics, vol 22, pp 141-61. 
 
Deimer, G.  (2002),  “Bank-Financed Irrigation and Drainage Projects:  Review of 
Institutional Components,”  World Bank Technical Paper # 524, in 
Institutional Reform for Irrigation and Drainage. 
 
De Villiers, G. D. T., Schmitz, P. M. U. and Booysen, H. J. (1996), “South 
Africa’s Water Resources and the Lesotho Highlands Water Scheme:  A 
Partial Solution to the Country’s Water Problems,” International Journal of 
Water Resources Development, vol 12, no 1. 
 
Diao, Xinshen and Roe, Terry.  (2003),  “Can a Water Market Avert the ‘double-
whammy’ of Trade Reform and Lead to a ‘win-win’ Outcome, Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management, vol 45, no 30, pp 708-23. 
 
Dinar, Ariel and Subramanian, Ashok. (1997),  “Water Pricing Experiences on 
International Perspective,” World Bank Technical Paper #386. 
 
Direction Generale des Resources en Eau.  (1998), “Etude du Secteur de l'Eau en 
Tunisie.”  Bechtel Inc & SCET-Tunisie, Ministry of Agriculture, Direction 
Générale des Ressources en Eau, Tunisia. 
 
Easter, K. William, Dixon, J.A. and Hufschmidt, M.M. (1991),  Watershed 
Resource Management (Studies from Asia and the Pacific), Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.  
 
19 
Easter, K. William. (2000),  “Asia’s Irrigation Management in Transition:  A 
Paradigm Shift Faces High Transaction Costs,”  Review of Agricultural 
Economics, vol 22, no 2, pp 370-88. 
 
El Hasnaoui, A., Boulassel, A. and Raki, M.  (2002),  “Freins Socio-Economiques 
a la Valorisation de l'Eau dans les Grands Perimetres Irrigues au Maroc,” 
Paper presented at the Agadir Conference on Irrigation Water Policies: 
Micro and Macro Considerations. Agadir, Maroc, 15-17 June 2002.  
 
Gakpo, E.F.Y., Du Plessis, L.A. and Viljoen, M.F.  (2001), “Towards Institutional 
Arrangements to Ensure Optimal Allocation and Security of South Africa’s 
Water Resources, Agrekon vol 40, no 1, March, pp 87-103. 
 
Grey, D., Gilgan-Hunt, E., Sharma, N., Roth, D., and Okau, V.  (1996),  “African 
Water Resources:  Challenges and Opportunities for Sustainable 
Development,” World Bank Technical Paper no. 331, September. 
 
Hearne, R.R. (1998),  “Institutional and Organizational Arrangements for Water 
Markets in Chile,” in Easter, K.W., Dinar, A. and Rosegrant, M.W. (eds), 
Markets for Water:  Potential and Performance, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, Boston. 
 
Howitt, R.  (1998),  “Spot Prices, Option Prices, and Water Markets: An Analysis 
of Emerging Markets in California,” in Easter, K.W., Dinar, A. and 
Rosegrant, M.W. (eds), Markets for Water:  Potential and Performance, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston. 
 
Kloezen, W.H.  (1998),  “Water Markets Between Mexican User Associations,” 
Water Policy, vol 1, pp 437-55. 
 
Lazarus, Peter.  (1997),  “Towards a Regulatory Framework for the Management 
of Groundwater in South Africa,”  Report to the Water Research 
Commission and the Department of Water Affairs and Forestries, WRC 
report #789/1/98, DWAF report #Geo 202 (389). 
 
Moris, J. and Thom, D.J.  (1990),  Irrigation Development in Africa:  Lessons of 
Experience,  Westview Press, Boulder, CO.  
 
20 
Palacios, E.V.  (1999),  “Benefits and Second Generation Problems of Irrigation 
Management Transfer in Mexico,” Economic Development Institute 
Participatory Irrigation Management Case Studies Series, sponsored by the 
Economic Development Institute of the World Bank and the International 
Irrigation Management Institute, June. 
 
Perret, S.R.  (2002),  “Water Policies and Smallholding Irrigation Schemes in 
South Africa: A History and New Institutional Challenges,” Water Policy, 
vol 4,  no. 3, pp 283-300. 
 
Rosegrant, Mark W. and Perez, Nicostrato D.  (1997),  “Water Resources 
Development in Africa:  A Review and Synthesis of Issues, Potentials, and 
Strategies for the Future,” EPTD Discussion Paper #28, IFPRI, Sept. 
 
Shah, T., B. Koppen, V., Merry, D., Lange, M. and Samad, M.  (2002), 
“Institutional Alternatives in African Smallholder Irrigation:  Lessons from 
International Experience with Irrigation Management Transfer,” IWMI 
Research Report #60, Sri Lanka.   
 
Simas, J.  (2002),  “Issues Affecting Irrigation and Drainage Sectors in Latin 
America: Lessons From Mexico, Argentina and Brazil,” World Bank 
Technical Paper #524 in Institutional Reform for Irrigation and Drainage, 
Washington, D.C. 
 
Thobani, M.  (1998),  “Meeting Water Needs in Developing Countries: Resolving 
Issues in Establishing Tradable Water Rights,” Easter, K.W., Dinar, A. and 
Rosegrant, M.W. (eds), Markets for Water:  Potential and Performance, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston. 
 
Tubpan, Yuavanes.  (1986),  “The Economics of Small Tank Irrigation,” in Easter, 
K. William (ed),  Irrigation Investment, Technology, and Management 
Strategies for Development, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, pp 129-46. 
 
Villinski, M.T.  (2002), A Financial Economics Approach to Pricing Multiple-
Exercise Option Contracts for Water, Draft Ph.D. Dissertation, Department 





Williamson, O.E.  (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Free Press, 
New York, NY. 
 
World Bank.  (1993), Water Resources Management (A World Bank Policy 
Paper), The World Bank, Washington, D.C.  
 
World Bank.  (2003),  “Water Resources Sector Strategy:  Strategic Directions for 
World Bank Engagement,” Draft World Bank paper, Feb. 
 
Zekri, Slim and Easter, K. William.  (2003),   “Institutional and Organizational 
Reforms in LDCs: Management Transfers, Private Managers and Water 
Markets,” Draft paper, Dept. of Applied Economics, University of 








  Type of Project   
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
  Irrigation Board Systems Small holder Systems 
  ____________________ __________________   
   
 
Full cost as % of gross farm income  1%  12-16% 
 
 





Source:   Shah et al., 2002. 